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impose for managers. Administrative repertoire of prevention and intervention strategies is not 
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organizations and individuals included in crisis management process. Increased politicization of 
crisis processes imposes new demands on crisis managers. New kinds of crises require a new way 
of thinking. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In a certain way crises are constants of social life. Their names and dates 
are constants of social life, the cornerstone of historic eras. They have changed 
significantly the entire societies and cultures. So crises have been the integral part 
of human history, and they will also mark our future. Namely, with the 
development of the society and the progress in technology, human kind is facing 
frequent and more diverse crises. As a consequence, our planet has become „the 
world of risk“(Beck, 2002) in which the activities in one country have a dramatic 
influence on populations beyond its borders. This refers to the devastating natural 
disasters, international and domestic disturbances in vital products and services 
supply, industrial and nuclear accidents, fires in storehouses and hotels, accidents 
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of aircrafts and ships, laboratory experiments out of control, unrests and other 
social conflicts, terrorist attacks on political leaders and ordinary citizens, 
hijackings of trains, aircraft and ships, hunger and epidemics of infectious 
diseases. These are serious challenges for the police and other subjects of security 
system in each society.  
Crises are actually abstract concepts for real events that can push certain 
community, region, nation or the whole world to the edge of chaos. These real and 
devastating events present a challenge for social, political and administrative 
elites, questioning the philosophical, social and moral nature of political leaders, 
society and world community, causing the changes that were inconceivable in the 
past. Remembrance on Brixton disorders, Challenger and Chernobyl disasters, 
sinking of Estonia and Akile Lauro ships, AIDS epidemic etc., are followed by 
fear, grief and anger, and a number of questions: Why did it happen? Was it 
possible to avoid the disaster? Who is responsible? The answers are often 
incomplete; the facts and evidence are not always transparent, while the public 
forgets quickly. 
The European continent has always been the crisis prone place. The 
European history is full of text-book examples of different crises imaginable 
ranging from classic epidemics of infectious diseases to all forms of modern 
warfare, from a deep economic crisis to modern terrorism, from a serious 
environmental menace to a nuclear disaster, from the “mad cows’ disease” to the 
“millennium bug”. While the national governments are very slowly becoming 
aware of the crucial importance of establishing the appropriate institutional 
capacities for crisis management, new crises are emerging at the horizon.   
However, it should be noted that our thought on crisis evolved. 
Comprehension of disasters and destruction as God’s punishments have been 
overgrown more or less, although many Africans even today talk about the AIDS 
in these terms. A rational scientific explanation of causes, patterns and 
characteristics of crises dominate the contemporary world (Boin, Kofman-Bos, 
and Overdijk, 2004). Regardless of that, crises and disasters will continue to 
surprise us in the future. We do not expect them to happen right now, but they 
always choose some very bad moment. We do not expect them to happen here, 
but they occur here, in our country. It is high time to take these events seriously, 
to learn from them and to implement this knowledge in order to prevent similar 
events in the future, or at least, limit their harmful consequences. That is the 
purpose of the foundation of crisis management as a new research field and 
academic discipline, process that occurred in the Western countries in 1980s. 
Crisis management has become an academic discipline present on a number of 
scientific and research institutions. The fund of available knowledge that is 
presented in specialized journals and conferences is growing. Parallel with that, 
crisis management is recognized in functional and organizational sense in the state 
and public administration, private non-profit and NGO sector and companies that 
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sell products and services. The old conceptions and value systems are changing in 
a way that crisis management is not perceived solely as a cost, but more and more 
as an investment.   
Methods and techniques developed within this discipline appear to be 
mostly efficient in coping with classic (“normal”) crisis. However, modern society 
is very dynamic environment in which only permanent and certain thing is the 
change. Due to that, the nature and character of modern crisis has changed. Their 
behavior and pattern differ from that of “normal” crises. The consequence of this 
change is that the old and proven responses on classic crises are not effective and 
could even be counter-productive. They are not part of the solution any more and 
they practically become a part of the problem.  
 In the above-mentioned context, the modern crises, very different in their 
nature, phenomenology and effects, represent particular challenge for scientists 
and  researchers and crisis managers and leaders in the state and public 
administration, first of all in police and other emergency services, non-profit 
organizations and business enterprises.  
 
2. A phenomenon of modern crises 
 
The classic crisis was a destructive event, which caused death, serious 
body harm and other damage. It was a clearly defined event, marked by a 
relatively clear beginning and end, cause of destruction, and victims (Rosenthal, 
1998). Such events still occur and they still cause damage and despair. But the 
causes of these events are much better understood today. Complex organizations 
now deal with such crises on a routine and professional basis. The classic crisis 
has become the routine crisis that falls within the accepted risk boundaries of 
modern society.  
The modern crisis is quite different from the events that used to be studied 
in terms of crisis.  It takes on endemic quality: a modern crisis is a logic 
counterpart of increasingly complex systems, which, for technological, financial 
or political reasons, cannot keep up with safety and security requirements. The 
modern crisis is of a complex nature: it consists of new combinations of known 
crisis that suggest solutions, which only turn out to be the sources of escalation. 
Moreover, the modern crisis has a self-perpetuating tendency; the process turns 
into a vicious circle fed by uncertainty about causes and causal chains (Masuch, 
1985; Ellis, 1998). There is no return to normalcy, because the future crises 
reappear in mutated forms. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. exemplify the 
modern crisis. It clearly showed that future crisis would significantly differ from 
those we know today. The modern crisis is the product of the society we live in. It 
is the result of what we value and of the way we perceive threats. Ulrich Beck 
pointed out that contemporary society, rather than by the risk of destruction, is 
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characterized by obsessive fear of the menace to security (Beck, 2002). It is also 
the logical outcome of the dominant trends like trans-nationalization, media 
society, technological development and dissipation of the state authority that have 
shaped and continue to shape our society.   
 
 ?rans-nationalization 
 
Crises are increasingly defined in transnational terms. We have become 
accustomed to the global scale of adverse developments: two World Wars, 
worldwide economic regression, and ecological trends have necessitated a global 
outlook. The original source of the problem at hand may continue to be local or 
national, but immediate and long-term impact of disasters and crises spread over 
countries and continents. A great many major disasters and crises of the last 
decade have already indicated the significance of these transnational dimensions. 
Until the Chernobyl disaster, nuclear power plant disaster scenarios were typically 
nation-bound, with international implications being subordinate to national 
concerns. However, the radiation fallout from Chernobyl that caused substantive 
damage to many countries in the Northern and Western Europe indicates trans-
boundary risks and consequences of modern crises. Since the dismantling of the 
Soviet Union, one of the most serious worries of the Western countries has been 
the appalling state of the nuclear plant facilities in Russia and other Eastern 
European states.  
Crises may flow over from the local areas and domains into the 
international arena, but more than ever they may be a part of manifestation of 
problems that are global in nature. (Kennedy, 1988; Huntington, 1996). The most 
convincing examples are some ecological trends (ozone layer depletion, global 
warming, and acid rains) that spread and, according to some experts, threaten 
Planet Earth, requiring the international action and huge investments. At the same 
time the worldwide nature of the problem generates considerable uncertainty 
(Nijkamp, 1994). Negative consequences that have been manifested within 
national borders so far, like environmental endangering and economic stagnation 
have more influence on political and social situation in neighboring countries. In 
Africa, mass migrations and refugee movements reflect the artificial and conflict-
ridden nature of state boundaries. Chemical accidents, air pollution, computer 
crimes, monetary crisis and viral diseases do not respect national borders. 
 
 Media society 
 
The subjective notion of disaster and crisis can be summarized in a version 
of the Thomas theorem: “if men define a situation as a crisis, it will be a crisis in 
its consequences” (Thomas and Thomas, 1928). When citizens or authorities 
define or declare a difficult situation a disaster or a crisis, this may have a decisive 
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impact on subsequent course of events. To call the situation by such an evocative 
word may provoke hyper-vigilance and over-reaction, running from collective 
stress to escalatory decision on the part of the authorities; on the other hand, it 
may solicit the collective energy and mobilize the emergent rules and norms 
necessary for the effective disaster and crisis management 
The modern crisis has its own version of the Thomas theorem: If CNN 
defines a situation as a crisis, it will indeed be a crisis with all its consequences. 
The media have become one of the driving forces in the world of crises. The 
media connect a crisis site with the rest of the world.  
The media seem particularly apt to select two categories of events for 
intensive coverage. First, they will be keen in the ominous prospect and 
occurrence of mega-disasters. The category of disasters defines itself by the sheer 
number of potential or actual causalities and the amount of physical damage. 
Second, the media take a particular interest in the typically subjectivist categories 
of crises with the characteristics of madness, panic and collective stress. Such 
disasters and crises may put a heavy burden on the social fabric. They may 
weaken the normative structure of society. 
 
Technological developments 
 
The technological jumps in the area of information and communication 
technology have been breathtaking both in speed and scope. Our perception of 
time and space limitations has changed dramatically with the availability of 
satellite communications, the Internet and the growth of mass transportation 
systems.  
These technological developments have consequences for both the causes 
and characteristics of crises. For instance, our technological systems have become 
so sophisticated and compressed that a minor malfunctioning is capable of 
causing a system breakdown (Perrow, 1984). Technology has become 
increasingly complex to a degree that users often do not understand how the 
technology works (which makes it hard to detect and correct malfunctioning 
elements). Yet, the efficient design of technological systems requires a tight 
coupling of elements (which enhances the chances of chain reactions). This 
explains why a malfunctioning valve and a broken warning light together may 
lead to a nuclear meltdown (Perrow, 1984). 
The development of these immanently high-risk technologies also affects 
the potential scope of a crisis. This applies to mega-carriers in the transportation 
industry – from the forebodings of the Estonia ferry disasters with nearly 900 
victims in September 1994, to the grim prospects of the new airplanes carrying 
600-800 passengers, as well as to nuclear power plants disasters. The increased 
dependency on computer systems makes our societal and economic systems 
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increasingly vulnerable. This vulnerability is compounded by the threat of hackers 
and cyber terrorism. (Demchak, 1999). 
 An entirely new dimension of high-risk technologies now calls our 
attention in the realm of medical technology and genetic manipulation. The 
consequences of these developments may reveal themselves in a few generations 
down the line, but the impact could be irreparable. Such developments can 
develop partly because of the growing discrepancy between mega-science and the 
knowledge or understanding of the part of administrative and political decision-
makers.  
 
Dissipation of state authority 
 
In the Western world, the role of the state has declined over the last 
decades. The traditional prerogative of civil authorities in times of crisis is giving 
way to a less pronounced and less taken-for-granted definitions of the tasks that 
public authorities are to perform in order to prevent, prepare for and cope with 
crises. The political and administrative trend has repercussions for the causes, 
characteristics and consequences of crises.  
The declining role of public authorities is captured in the twin 
developments of retrenchment and managerialism. As a result of performance 
crises, huge budget overruns and overall decline in public legitimacy, new 
governments were elected in the Western democracies on the promises of a New 
Public Management. One of the means to "do more with less" was found in 
spending cuts and a re-evaluation of priorities. Another means were found in the 
improvement of public management. 
In the atmosphere of retrenchment and reform, measures aimed at the 
prevention or mitigation of potential crises receive less attention than the problem 
at hand, which may be perceived by many as an endemic crisis of public 
governance. A decline in resources affects personnel numbers, maintenance 
activities, repairs, exercises, planning, in short: many factors that somehow may 
interact to cause a crisis. Since the benefits of crisis management activities are 
much harder to quantify than the costs, the importance of such activities is likely 
to be underappreciated which, in turn, may easily lead to underfunding.  
A significant counter-development is found in the increasing number of 
participants entering the crisis arena: private companies complement the 
traditional but declining role of the state. In other words, crisis responsibilities 
have become a shared concern or a co-production between private and public 
actors. Public safety, for instance, is depending more and more on the role of 
security companies. Crisis in large-scale organizations, even in public 
organizations, have become the near-exclusive domain of management 
consultants. It is now recognized that governmental actors can be a major source 
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of public and private crises, an observation that relegates the public role to one 
amongst many others.  
When crisis do occur, the public turns to public authorities for decisive 
action, instant relief and long-term leadership. Public authorities get caught 
between their limited abilities to provide effective crisis management and the 
increased willingness of the part of the public to scrutinize governmental actions 
and assign blame when deemed necessary. During crises a critical attitude towards 
government and its practices will rapidly translate into a decline of legitimacy. 
The loss of support pertains not only to what public authorities have done during 
the crisis but it also reduces the ambitions of the public authorities which refer to 
the prevention of future crises. The public role in the crisis arena then becomes 
part of a vicious circle.  
Arien Boin and Patric Lagadec suggest a very interesting comparative 
description of classic (traditional), modern and future crises (Boin and Lagadec, 
2000: 185-191). 
 
        Characteristics of Traditional `Faults' and Fault Management 
 
? a known, isolated event, framed within conventional hypotheses; 
? a situation perceived as manageable (technically, economically, socially); 
? costs relatively easy to estimate, and recoverable within the context of tried 
systems; 
? a limited duration; 
? codified intervention procedures, well known by the specialists solicited; 
? a limited number of interveners, all specialized in one aspect of the problem 
at hand; 
? well-determined roles, responsibilities and hierarchies, known by the 
services in charge.   
 
        Characteristics of Modern Crises 
 
? large impacts, large populations affected; 
? very high economic costs, surpassing the classical insurance capabilities; 
? unprecedented, generic and combined problems, affecting vital resources; 
? snowball dynamics due to a multitude of resonance phenomena; 
? emergency systems reacting on the wrong foot: obsolete, non-applicable and 
even counter-productive procedures; 
? extreme uncertainty that will not vanish within the emergency period; 
? a long duration with threats transforming over time; 
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? convergence, i.e. large numbers of actors and organizations bursting onto 
the scene; 
? critical communication problems: within the responsible organizations, with 
the public, the media, the victims (even populations very distant in space or 
time); 
? considerable stakes of all kinds. 
 
        Characteristics of Future Crises or `Breakdowns' 
 
? there is a pre- and post-breakdown state, the change being irreversible; 
? the breakdown is not due to a specific event: there is global and polymorph 
resonance; 
? basic and unquestioned procedures do not apply anymore: i.e. the 
fundamental principles, the identities, the contexts, the actors, the rules of 
the game, the defense mechanisms, the knowledge, all these tools are up for 
re-consideration; 
? breakdown brings repeated, iterative crises, with sudden crystallization, 
occurring and disappearing in a seemingly incomprehensible and random 
fashion; 
? powerfully anchored in deep disequilibria of the system, the breakdowns are 
even more resistant to conventional treatment; 
? the `decomposition' side being most perceptible, the prevailing impression is 
one of a generalized decoupling process, a work of disintegration almost 
impossible to suppress; 
? The breakdown pervades the whole theatre of operations. Fundamental 
problems resonate with each other, preventing any sequential treatment 
ordered in time, space and by category. There is a feeling of loss. 
 
3. Managing modern crises 
 
Crisis management is stenographic phrase for all managerial practices that 
refer to non-routine phenomena and development. It is usually associated with 
hectic moments of crisis decision-making but also covers area of prevention, 
preparedness and crisis response, as well as sensitive area of recovery and change. 
Old fashioned response to crisis was recovery through combination of 
flexibility, improvisation and prudence of individuals, groups and societies. Over 
the time both the practitioners and scientists tried to comprise the best crisis 
management practice into operative procedures, check lists, organizational 
structures and job descriptions.  
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Versatile nature of modern crises has direct implications on crisis 
management. The administrative repertoire of prevention and intervention 
strategies is not adequate for modern crises that are more complex and oblique. 
Moreover, the conventional organizational model of coordination is inappropriate 
for dealing with proliferous number of organizations and individuals included in 
crisis management process. Increased politicization of crisis process imposes new 
requests on crisis managers. In short, new crises require a new way of thinking.  
In the future, complex disasters will be the rule, not the exception. While 
the stake is rising, the pitfall of traditional crisis repertoire is becoming wider. The 
gap between “normal” prospects of what the authorities can do to prevent the 
crisis and actual disturbances will be wider. Traditional strategies of crisis 
management – secrecy, privilege of executive power, and autarchy – are losing 
the ground in conditions where awaked public wants to know the details. The 
increased media competition will strain capacity of crisis authorities to win the 
support for preparedness and intervention strategy. 
Future crises will necessitate preparations that will comprise recovery 
strategies and those based on anticipation. If there is consensus on the fact that 
recovery is the key in dealing with future crises, it is necessary to organize this 
recovery in proper manner, e.g. to facilitate fast, flexible, innovative and effective 
response when future crisis emerge.  
As new crises by their nature are becoming more complex and 
transnational, the need for flexibility in prevention will be more important. Of 
course, chances for “routine crises” have to be reduced, based on general 
knowledge and specific lessons learned from the previous crises. However, an 
excessive reliance on prevention leaves social and political system exposed to 
consequences of new forms of crises. The balance between prevention and 
resilience is a real challenge for crisis managers.  
The preparation of preventive measures and planning the activities that are 
to be taken in the case of crisis for a long time have been within the mandate of 
mezzo-level managers and operative agencies. The work in this field has 
characteristics of bureaucratic routine that is far from hustle and conflicts 
characteristic for “high” policy. The new context of risk and crisis management is 
quite different. An appropriate perspective of new forms of crisis management 
emphasizes social and psychological challenges and assumes great media 
attention that inevitably puts the event in the politic arena. In this context the very 
labeling of certain social circumstances or concrete event with the term “crisis” 
becomes a political act. In that context, it is not a routine bureaucratic job any 
more, but a challenge for political leaders and highest officials. Of course, crisis 
management must not remain the exclusive domain of government officials, as 
their agencies would not achieve results without the help of intermediary 
organizations. 
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But crises create situations that cannot be predicted and that call for 
responses that have not been programmed. During the crisis tactical problems are 
not the core of the challenge. What is at stake is the very being of activity, policy 
or the institution. Top managers of the organization have to take the rudder in 
their own hand in a very unclear environment. They have to identify key 
objectives, review the priorities, rethink the relations with stakeholders, clear the 
communication strategy; in short, they have to provide cement that keeps the 
organization together. Leaders often understand this as a task of the security 
personnel, not as their own task. As they have no knowledge of future crises 
pattern, they are prone to use classic model in new context. However, new crises 
are bringing new challenges. The facts remain unknown – you know that you will 
not know. Managers take the risk if they do not stop unusual activities that 
influence crisis. At the same time, they risk their job or company if they stop 
those activities without strong reasons they are not sure about. This is like piloting 
in the middle of tornado. They have to be trained to anticipate banishing given 
basic rules, to outline new vision, to recompose new coalitions of stakeholders, to 
avoid key errors in communication and decision-making. Imperatives that might 
help an organization to prepare for the unknown are the following (Boin, Lagadec, 
2000):? 
  
Ensure Awareness at the Highest Levels 
 
The first and indispensable step is to get the problem of crises and 
breakdowns on the agenda of top-level decision-makers (‘t Hart, 1997; Preston 
and Cottam, 1997). Executive awareness may be raised through workshops or 
simulations specifically dedicated to new crises and to the decision-makers' new 
responsibilities (Kleiboer, 1997). The aim is to forge new attitudes: tolerate open 
and shared questioning about possible, yet uncertain situations; reflect on the 
decision-making process in the absence of clear expertise; understand the need to 
communicate internally and externally whilst in a situation of uncertainty, even 
complete ignorance, for the extended periods of time; steering complex systems 
by accommodating the co-existence of conflicting logics.   
 
Develop Appropriate Operational Capabilities 
 
In order to facilitate a resilient response, the following organizational 
capabilities must be developed: 
? monitoring capability and capability to detect weak and non-conventional 
signals; 
? emergency information systems, which can process relevant information to 
and from central authorities; 
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? alert and mobilization capability of crisis units, with support from all parts 
of the organization;  
? capability to handle the technicalities of `first emergencies': actors must be 
prepared to deal with uncertainty and complexity and be able to relate 
technical matters to strategic issues; 
? capability for action in situations of decentralized crises: provide for an 
organizational structure which allows the largest possible number of actors 
access to the system's response capacity (betting on centralization only 
leads to heaviness, closed logics, communication delays; see `t Hart, 
Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993). 
 
Engage in continuing preparation efforts 
 
Experience, previous research and the contributions in this field suggest a 
few mandatory signposts for the effective preparation. A continuous practice of 
feedback from experience in a constructive spirit, each crisis episode has to be 
subjected to a precise analysis to identify and understand the series of events that 
occurred in handling the case. Immediate operational learning points have to be 
extracted; this means that the analyses must relate to the functioning of decision 
support systems. International cross-fertilization has recently proven to be 
extremely useful.‡  
Tests and simulation exercises - It is necessary to engage in a continuous 
training program; not so much to prepare for well-codified faults or failures (the 
`fire exercise' ritual), but for destabilizing surprises. It is irresponsible to rely on 
previous experience only for collective training. Simulation is a bare necessity. 
These simulations have to be followed by rigorous debriefings (`t Hart, 1997): this 
effort, often neglected, is indispensable to make progress. The tests must be both 
extremely short to develop the mobilization reflexes of the teams, and more 
complex to develop the polymorph capabilities which will be required for steering 
through crisis. 
Training - It is of major importance to provide the various managers with 
the appropriate types of training. Different responsibilities require different 
preparatory efforts: the executives, who will play a crucial political role 
                                                 
‡ After ice storms destroyed the electrical grid of southern Quebec in January 1998 (see Scanlon, 
1999), the French electrical company EDF (Electricite de France) sent a team to study the 
problems and solutions developed by Hydro-Quebec and government agencies. Less than two 
years later, France was struck by two successive storms that destroyed part of the French grid. 
EDF reacted quickly: the nature of the problem was immediately understood, key mistakes to 
avoid were known, and strategic initiatives were undertaken. EDF leaders credit the learning 
process after the Quebec experience in explaining their successful crisis management. 
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throughout the crises; the crisis unit managers, who will have to steer extremely 
complex systems with often little known and massively perverse effects; the 
spokespersons; the experts - abruptly dislocated from their laboratories to the 
television set - are often obliged to offer judgments whilst their tools are deficient. 
In advanced organizations, media training is a common feature. But it is necessary 
to go much further: new areas of management issues are to be discovered and 
shared with those concerned. 
Inter-actor learning - As crises are processes unfolding amidst complex 
networks, it is necessary to expand the learning process to the external world: 
meetings, feedback from experience and exercises, the exploration of 
unprecedented vulnerabilities - these learning mechanisms should not be 
internally restricted. A continuous enlargement of the circle of actors involved is 
necessary. 
Personal involvement of elites - As crises and breakdowns typically touch 
upon fundamental elements of an organization’s mission and structures, nothing 
serious is likely to happen without the durable involvement of the organizational 
leaders. Personal involvement in preparatory and learning processes tends to 
change completely when the `boss' is personally engaged in the case. This 
requires that high-level managers break with the pervasive attitude that a highly 
placed person does not need to learn about crises and crisis management, neither 
that he should not get involved with simulations nor engage in feedback from 
experience. 
A general scheduling of the intervention - One has to be wary of 
spectacular plans and projects without follow-up, which exhaust energy, goodwill 
and budgets. It is necessary to introduce tests and resources progressively over 
time, gradually and incessantly, involving increasing numbers of actors. All 
aspects of learning have to be canvassed: an undertrained institution cannot 
support multiplied exercises or feedback from painful experiences without getting 
effective methodological and know-how support at the same time. 
Mastery of core processes - Any effort to prepare an organization, or a 
network of organizations, for unknown crises that may occur sometime in the 
future requires an intimate knowledge of core processes and critical vulnerabilities 
(Wilson, 1989). The generics of crisis management must fit the specifics of the 
organization’s core competences. In a situation of uncertainty, solutions must be 
anchored in a deep understanding of the organization’s inner-workings. In today's 
world, where executives typically are generalists, not specialists, crisis preparation 
will thus be enhanced by project-management methodologies. The temporary 
nature of ‘project management’ must, in turn, be offset by a conscious effort to 
embed the developed structure in the organization. 
Due to the complexity, understanding the real nature of the modern crisis 
is very hard managerial task. A crisis manager is restrained by the complex 
conditions and characteristics of undeveloped crisis and uncertainty of the results. 
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According to Turner, the unreliability of the response could result from the “initial 
lack of information, wrong initial classification, of change of the nature of the 
incident during its development” (Turner, 1992). Resulting dissonance between 
the definition of a situation and its real and actual characteristics undermine crisis 
response. Crisis managers believe that they are solving the crisis, while careful 
analysis of the situation shows that this is not the case. It usually takes some time 
for crisis managers to adjust their definition of the situation.  
Crisis managers are undecided between immediate action and long-term 
effectiveness. Traditional repertoires of crisis management are marked by 
preoccupation “here and now” dealing with the acute threat. Consequences of 
initial decision are fading in the background of actual happening. However, 
modern crisis is not a single event, but a long term process. Long after the crisis 
began, crisis managers are facing problems that can become “a crisis after crisis”. 
For example, a minor incident like oil spill or gas leak can have long-term effects 
that are much harder to deal with. Such crises do not fit the traditional crisis 
repertoire.  
Consequences of contemporary crises have tendencies to be as durable and 
intensive as their acute phase, while leaders are under pressure of informal 
investigation, provocative journalism, and demands related to insurance and legal 
procedures against them.  
Finally, in future crises it should be noted that, in the beginning, they give 
free hands to politicians and managers, enhancing their legitimacy. But this 
cannot last for a long. In the moment of serious crisis eyes of the nation are on 
their political leaders. While the success in solving crisis makes statesmen out of 
them, failure to do so eliminates them from political scene.  
 
4. Closing remarks 
 
A crisis response is a serious challenge. A crisis requires critical decisions 
that have to be made under the unsuitable circumstances. At the same time, the 
crisis is generating obstacles for quality decision-making. Common problems are 
propelling during the crisis. All of these are multiplying due to the nature and 
character of modern crises. Crisis managers have to solve complex dilemmas 
without the necessary information in unsteady organizational environment and 
under serious stress. If we consider dilemmas emerging during the crisis, crisis 
management could be labeled mission impossible. For example, crisis managers 
have to decide, during the initial phase of the crisis, whether it is the whole crisis 
or just a signal of forthcoming crisis. From the limited and fragmented pieces of 
information he has to conclude if it is the whole story or just the beginning. This 
dilemma has a consequence in resource allocation: should they all be directed to 
what seems to be the beginning of the crisis or it is better to wait until the 
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situation develops. This dilemma is even harder during the so-called conflict 
crises. War and terrorism are followed by disinformation campaigns, sudden 
attacks and multiple arenas.  
In the circumstances where emotions are very intensive, it is impossible to 
pose impartial diagnosis. Crises are often treated as political failures. In such 
circumstances research following the crisis is less related to learning and more to 
blame game. Journalists and citizens consider that someone has to be responsible 
for faults and failures that resulted in crisis. Politicians are aware of this and they 
respond by improving their defense routines like seeking for acceptable negating 
and developing public relations skills. The more time they devote to this, the less 
time they have to use the crisis potential for learning. Real efforts for improving 
the system are often lost in post-crisis politics. If there is such a thing as post 
crisis learning, it is a long-term process.  
 All the above-mentioned indicates that modern crises are significant 
challenge for managers, exposing substantial and organizational insufficiency of 
the classic repertoire of crisis managers and their philosophy, and testing the 
capabilities of individuals, teams and whole organizations. 
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REZIME
 
Krize su stalni pratilac društvenog života. Sa napretkom društva i 
tehnologije koja postaje sve dostupnija i sve komplikovanija, ljudska vrsta se 
suo?ava sa sve rasnovrsnijim i brojnijim krizama.U ovom radu razmatraju se 
karakteristike fenomena modernih kriza i njihova razlika u odnosu na klasi?ne 
krize, kao i najzna?ajniji procesi koji su doveli do ove transformacije. Pored toga 
isti?u se klju?ne teško?e koje moderne krize postavljaju pred menadžere. 
Promenljiva priroda savremenih kriza ima direktne implikacije na krizni 
menadžment. Administrativni repertoar strategija prevencije i intervencije nije 
odgovaraju?i za savremene krize koje su sve složenije i sve više me?uzavisne. 
Vreme je da se ovi doga?aji uzmu ozbiljno, da iz njih po?ne da se u?i i da ta 
znanja po?nu da se primenjuju kako bi se ubudu?e takvi doga?aji izbegli, ili 
barem ograni?ile njihove štetne posledice. Upravo u tome i jeste smisao 
zasnivanja kriznog menadžmenta kao novog istraživa?kog polja i nastavno nau?ne 
discipline. Štaviše, konvencionalni organizacioni model koordinacije je 
neprikladan za postupanje sa prolifeliraju?im mnoštvom organizacija i pojedinaca 
uklju?enih u proces kriznog menadžmenta. Sve ve?a politizacija kriznog procesa 
stavlja nove zahteve pred krizne menadžere. Moderne krize javljaju se kao izazov 
za savremene menadžere pokazuju?i sadržinsku i organizacionu nedostatnost 
klasi?og kriznog menadžerskog repertoara i filozofije, ozbiljno stavljaju?i na 
probu sposobnosti pojedinaca, timova i celih organizacija. Nova kriza zahteva i 
novi na?in mišljenja. 
 
SUMMARY
 
Crises are the constants of social life. With the development of the society 
and the progress in technologies, which become increasingly available to almost 
everyone, human kind is faced with more diverse and more numerous crises. This 
paper deals with the characteristics of the modern crises phenomenon and how the 
modern crises are different when compared to traditional crises, as well as the 
main processes that influenced these transformations. In addition to this, the 
authors discuss the key difficulties the managers are faced with when coping with 
modern crises. The administrative repertoire of prevention and intervention 
strategies is not adequate for modern crises that are much more complex and 
interdependent. It is high time to take these events seriously, to learn from them 
and to implement this knowledge in order to prevent similar events in the future, 
or at least, limit their harmful consequences. That is the purpose of the 
establishing of crisis management as a new research field and academic discipline. 
Moreover, the conventional model of coordination is improper for dealing with 
proliferate number of organizations and individuals involved in crisis 
management process. Ever increasing politicization of crisis processes imposes 
new demands on crisis managers. Modern crises appear as significant challenges 
for contemporary managers, exposing substantial and organizational insufficiency 
of the classic repertoire of crisis managers and their philosophy, and testing the 
capabilities of individuals, teams and entire organizations. New kinds of crises 
require a new way of thinking. 
